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DISCOVERY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES:
A NEW ASPECT OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY?
JonN D. O'REILLY, JR.*
Only recently there arose for the first time in American judicial
history a case which presented directly an almost unique problem of
constitutional law. In the light of current developments in the scope
and methods of Governmental regulation it is more than likely that
the problem referred to will eventually have to be solved by legislation,
and it is principally for the purpose of outlining a background for such
legislation that this paper is written.
The case referred to above is that of United States v. General
Motors Corporation et al.,1 in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Civil No. 2177.- The
suit was instituted in October, 1940, as one of the usual proceedings in
equity by the United States for the enforcement of the antitrust laws.2
After a preliminary motion for a bill of particulars was denied (2
F. R. D. 346) the defendants answered, and then, pursuant to Rule 33
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, served upon the United States
a list of interrogatories.
It was at this stage of the proceedings that the case departed from
the lines of conventional development. The United States, in addition
to objecting to the interrogatories separately upon a variety of grounds,
asserted that by reason of immunities and privileges inhering in and
attaching to it as a sovereign it was not compellable to answer any
interrogatories at all. The Government asserted its willingness to make
disclosures to its adversary, as evidenced by its having voluntarily filed
a stipulation of facts in the case, but contended that answers to the
interrogatories filed should not be required because, (a) they were so
numerous that the labor and expense of compiling answers would be
excessive, (b) the interrogators could, with no greater labor and ex-
pense, obtain the information for themselves, and (c) much of the
information sought was immaterial to the issues of the case. The case
was submitted on briefs, and the Court, in a decision handed down in
October, 1942, rejected completely the Government's contentions of its
freedom from an obligation to answer interrogatories put to it in a
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Special Attorney, Antitrust
Division, United States Department of Justice. The opinions expressed in this
article are entirely those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Department of Justice.
12 F. R. D. 346 (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1942).
'26 STAT. 209 (1937) ; 38 STAT. 731 (1914) ; 15 U. S. C. A. §§1, 18 (1939).
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civil action, but sustained its other contentions as to most of the inter-
rogatories involved.
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the merits of this
decision or of the reasons which the Court adduced in support of it,
although these will be adverted to in the course of the exposition which
follows. At best the decision of a district court is a tentative resolu-
tiona* of the state of existing law, and it may be that the need of
appropriate legislation makes the decision of any court fall short of a
solution of the underlying problem.
As far as the present state of the law is concerned (and that is the
principal subject of this exposition) the matter may be discussed under
three headings or issues: (1) Does the sovereign's immunity from suit
without its consent protect the United States from the ordinary litigant's
obligation to answer interrogatories? (2) Is there a common-law
privilege of non-disclosure in the United States? (3) Does the stat-
utory privilege which the United States undoubtedly enjoys extend to
interrogatories in lawsuits to which it is a party?
I. EXISTING PRACTICE
Before entering upon a discussion of these points it may be relevant
to say a word about existing practice as to discovery in civil suits to
which the Government is a party. To some extent this matter is cov-
ered by informal discussions between counsel and by voluntary stipula-
tions filed as part of the record. This practice, however, is far from
uniform. The scope of the revelations made in a particular case depends
upon a variety of factors, such as the presence or absence of a criminal
aspect of the case, the ease or difficulty of making information available,
and the "imponderable" elements attendant upon the case.
Apart from informal discussions and voluntary stipulations it has
been the practice for the Government to react to interrogatories put to
it in much the same way as do private litigants. Thus, there are many
cases in the books in which the United States has been ordered to
answer interrogatories over its objections addressed to the merits of the
interrogatories (but not to its own immunities), and there are cases in
which adjudications have been made upon the sufficiency of answers
given by the Government.
4
; An order overruling objections to interrogatories is not a "final judgment,"
and so is not subject to appeal. The stage of the proceeding as upon dismissal
of the case or adjudication of contempt for refusal of the interrogatee to comply
with an order (under Rule 37) requiring an answer, or after answers and final
judgments on the merits upon exceptions from a ruling admitting to the answers
to the interrogatories in evidence.
' See Curtis v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 459 (D. Mass. 1939) under Rule 31
of the Admiralty Rules; C. J. Tower and Sons v. United States, 71 F. (2d) 438
(C. C. P. A. 1934) under the Customs Laws; United States v. American Solvents
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This existing practice sheds little light upon the legal question in-
volved. It is impossible to say to what extent informal revelations and
voluntary stipulations are engendered by consciousness of a legal obli-
gation to make discovery, how far they are attributable to an instinct
of "fair play," or wherein they are strategic "trading" devices in the
preliminary stages of a lawsuit. Similarly inconclusive are the decided
cases wherein the Government has submitted to orders to answer in-
terrogatories. In none of them was the issue of immunity raised, and
in only one of them5 was the issue of Governmental privilege set up.
Thus, the General Motors case above referred to was one of first im-
pression, there having been no direct precedent in point.
Where no direct precedent is in existence it is the custom of the
legal profession to argue from what lawyers are pleased to call "prin-
ciple," which usually means the analogy of points which have been
authoritatively decided. It is to '-principle" that we must turn here.
II. IMMUNITY OF THE SOVEREIGN
(A) Bills of Discovery
The first principle to be examined for inquiry as to whether it
contains an apt analogy is that of the sovereign's immunity from suit
in its own courts without its consent. This examination can be divided
into two parts: (1) Does the submission of interrogatories to the
United States amount to bringing suit for discovery from which the
United States by virtue of its sovereignty is immune? (2) Should
the burdens of the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure be construed as not binding upon the United States under
the doctrine of statutory interpretation that burdensome provisions of a
statute do not bind the sovereign unless he is expressly mentioned?
It is a commonplace that prior to 1912 when the Federal Equity
Rules, including Rule 58, were adopted, the only available method of
obtaining information from an adversary was the bill of discovery.
Although bills of -discovery arose out of the common-law disqualification
of a party to testify in a case, centuries of practice made this bill the
sole means of obtaining discovery from an adversary even after the
disqualification had been abrogated. The bill of discovery took vari-
ous forms. Thus, a party to an action at law could bring a collateral
bill in equity against his adversary in order to obtain information to
be used as evidence in the action. A plaintiff in equity could insert,
interrogatories in his bill, and a defendant in equity could obtain in-
and Chemical Corporation of California, 2 Fed. Rules Service 339 (D. Del. 1939)
(a suit to recover alcohol taxes).
5 Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F. R. D. 624, 4 Fed. Rules Service 514 (N. D. Ohio
1941).
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formation from the plaintiff by means of a cross-bill for discovery, but
in no event could a party obtain discovery without becoming a plaintiff
nor could discovery be obtained from the adverse party without making
him a defendant.0
It is, of course, elementary that the United States cannot without
its express consent be made a defendant in any case.7 Thus, if the
submission of interrogatories to the United States has the effect of
making it a defendant in a suit for discovery the interrogatories will
not lie.
The question may be boiled down to one of whether the discovery
provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure effect merely changes in
practice and procedure, or effect changes in the form of obtaining an
ancient remedy.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to construe the Rules of Civil
Procedure in a way which would enlarge the scope of judicial relief
against the United States. In United States v. Sherwood,8 a judg-
ment creditor of a contractor who had contracted with the United
States sued the United States in the District Court under the Tucker
Act. 9 The theory of the plaintiff was that since Rule ,17(b) 10 provides
that the capacity of an individual to sue shall be determined by the
law of his domicil, and the plaintiff was domiciled in New York, the
law of which state provided that a judgment creditor might sue a
person indebted to the judgment debtor, and since the United States
was indebted to the judgment debtor, the plaintiff was entitled to sue
the United States. The action was dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
and the Court used the following language :1"
"We think that nothing in the new Rules of Civil Practice, so far
as they may be applicable in suits brought in the district courts under
the Tucker Act, authorizes the maintenance of any suit against the
United States to which it has not otherwise consented. An authority
conferred upon a court to make rules of procedure for the exercise of
its jurisdiction is not an authority to enlarge that jurisdiction, and the
Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C., 723b authorizing this
Court to prescribe rules of procedure in civil actions gave it no author-
ity to modify, abridge or enlarge the substantive rights of litigants or
to enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of federal courts."
This language is indicative of a disposition not to enlarge by reason
of the Rules of Civil Procedure the traditional limits of discovery
against the United States.
STORy, EQ. PL. (10th ed. 1892) §§35, 311, 390.
Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331, 27 S. Ct. 388, 51 L. ed. 510 (1907).
8 312 U. S. 584, 27 S. Ct. 388, 85 L. ed. 1058 (1941).
o044 STAT. 121, 125 (1926), 28 U. S. C. A. §41 (20) (1927).
"0Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17(b).
2 312 U. S. 584, 589. 61 S. Ct. 767, 771, 85 L. ed. 1058, 1062 (1941).
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Historically, as they have been used in the United States, beginning
with their introduction in Massachusetts 12 where they were introduced
by reason of absence of equity jurisdiction in the courts, interrogatories
have been characterized as a "cheap bill of discovery." 13 This sort of
description of the phenomenon points to the conclusiori that the device
of "interrogatories" differs only in form, but not in substance, from
the traditional bill of discovery. This conclusion is strengthened by
further analysis of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The methods there
provided14 for enforcing the requirements that interrogatories be an-
swered preserve all of the elements of a separate bill in equity. Motion
to compel answers must be filed and served. Answer to the motion is
had, followed by hearing and order, sanctioned by adjudication of con-
tempt or decree of dismissal, etc.
The only consent which the Congress has made to discovery against
the United States is that expressed in Section 164 of the Judicial Code,15
which provides for "calls for information" from the departments of
the Government by the Court of Claims. In Robinson v. United
States,6 where this statute was critically examined, the Court of Claims
held that the procedure under the statute is "more analogous to the bill
of discovery as used in chancery than it is to the use of subpoena duces
tecun."'1 7 It is arguable that since Congress has expressly consented
to one form of discovery against the United States the inference should
be that all other forms of discovery in all other courts are not con-
sented to.
In Great Britain, under the procedure by which interrogatories have
been substituted for bills of discovery, the courts have held that the
Crown, by virtue of its immunity from suit, is not subject to interroga-
tories even in cases where the general immunity from suit has been
waived. Thus, in Thomas v. Regina'8 the Court disallowed a motion
for discovery of material documents in the possession of the Govern-
ment by the plaintiff in a petition of right. In the course of the argu-
ment Chief Justice Cockburn stated:
"If it had been intended to extend Section 50 of the Common Law
Procedure Act, 1854, as to discovery of documents, to the case of
petitions of right, there would have been inserted some enactment say-
ing that an officer should answer as in the case of bodies corporate."
Some time later, in Tomnline v. Regina,'0 an attack was made upon
the Thomas case. There Bramwell, L. J., answered:
1 MASS. STAT. (1851) c. 233, §98; MAss. G. L., c. 231, §61.
"' Wilson v. Webber, 2 Gray (Mass.) 558, 561 (1854).
x, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37.
136 STAT. 1140 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. 272 (1927).
18 50 Ct. Cl. 159 (1915). 17 50 Ct. Cl. 167 (1915).
18L. R. 10 Q. B. 44 (1874). " L. R. 4 Ex. Div. 252 (1879).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"I will assume that technical reasons exist which prevent a suppliant
from obtaining discovery .... If technical difficulties do exist in the
way of obtaining discovery from the Crown, probably the legislature
has intentionally left those difficulties in existence in order that it may
be in the discretion of the Crown whether it will afford the informa-
tion sought for by a suppliant."
In the General Motors case the Court agreed that the United States
could not be compelled to make discovery in an action brought for that
purpose. The Court stated, however: "But that is far from saying
that the Government in bringing a civil action against an individual
may not be subjected to the ordinary rules governing procedure in the
Court in which suit is brought." To the extent that this language
suggests that the United States waives its immunities by vountarily
instituting legal proceedings it is clearly not good law. No point is
better settled than that the sovereign immunity from suit can be waived
only by act of Congress and not by act of any executive officer.20 What
the Court probably had in mind was the analogy of counterclaims in
recoupment which may be asserted against the United States in actions
brought by it. It is clear, as exemplified by Bull v. United States,21
cited by the Court in the General Motors opinion, that a claim for money
wrongfully withheld by the Government may be used by way of recoup-
ment and credit in an action by the United States arising out of the
same transaction, even though the defendant would have no standing
to institute an original proceeding against the United States, and even
though he may not by cross-claim recover a sum in excess of that owing
by him to the Government. It is doubtful if this analogy supports the
Court's conclusion. Rule 13(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure ex-
pressly provides that, "These rules shall not be construed to enlarge
upon the limits now fixed by law the right to assert counterclaims or
to claim credits against the United States or an officer or agent thereof."
The limits fixed by cases such as the Bull case are that a private party
,may set off his own money claims against money claims prosecuted by
the Government. 22 There is no authority for the proposition that any
other form of relief may be had by a private individual in a suit brought
against him by the United States.
In one case23 the Court required a Governmental agency to respond
20 Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 270, 16 S. Ct. 754, 4 L. ed. 959, 965
(1896); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 388, 59 S. Ct. 292, 295, 83
L. ed. 235, 241 (1939) ; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 6 .S. Ct. 659, 666,
84 L. ed. 888, 891 (1940).
21295 U. S. 247, 261, 55 S. Ct. 695, 700, 79 L. ed. 1421, 1428 (1935).
22See United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 309
U. S. 506, 514, 60 S. Ct. 653, 657, 83 L. ed. 894, 899 (1940); and cases cited
supra note 20.
2 Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F. R. D. 624, 4 Fed. Rules Service 514 (N. D.
Ohio 1941).
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to interrogatories addressed to it by the defendant. This was a suit
brought by the Administrator of the Wages and Hours Division to
exact compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act. The case is not
a direct precedent upon the issue here under discussion, since the suit
there was in the name of an officer of the United States, rather than of
the United States itself, and it is a familiar doctrine that the rules with
respect to sovereign immunity, which attach to the sovereign itself, are
not always available to the officers of the sovereign.
24
(B) Interpretation of the Rules
An alternative topic of the issue of immunity is the matter of inter-
pretation of the discovery provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
A basic maxim of public law has been that,
"The King is not bound by any act of Parliament unless he be
named therein by special and particular words. The most general
words that can be devised ('any person or persons, bodies politic or
corporate, etc.') affect him not in the least if they may tend to restrain
or diminish any of his rights or interests.
'25
While this maxim has not been and should not be applied as a mere
mechanical formula,28 it is highly significant that the United States is
not expressly described in Rule 33, or in any of the other rules per-
taining to discovery, as a "party" who may be required to answer inter-
rogatories. This omission takes on added significance in the light of
the fact that other provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure make
express and sometimes exceptional provision for the United States in
other matters.
2 7
In the General Motors case the Court drew the inference from the
phrasing of Rule 37 that it must have been the intention of the framers
2 Osborn v. Bank of the 'United States, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738, 6 L. ed. 204
(1824) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 15 S. Ct. 240, 27 L. ed. 171 (1882);
cf. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. ed. 714 (1908).
1 BL. CoMm. 261, ciing the Magdalen College Case, 11 Co. Rep. (Eng.) at
74. Quoted as applicable to the United States as a sovereign; Dollar Savings
Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 227, 229, 22 L. ed. 80 (1873).
2 Compare United States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U. S. 600, 61 S. Ct. 742,
85 L. ed. 1071 (1941) with Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, 62 S. Ct. 972, 86
L. ed. (Adv. Ops.) 926 (1942); see also Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S.
379, 58 S. Ct. 275, 82 L. ed. 314 (1937) ; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank,
293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 79 L. ed. 211 (1934); United States v. Fox, 94 U. S.
315, 321, 24 L. ed. 192, 193 (1876).
27* The following rules make special provision for cases in which the United
States is a party: Rule 4(4) and (5) relating to service; Rule 12(a) relating
to answers and actions and crpss-claims; Rule 17(a) relating to actions for
use and benefit; Rule 25(d) relating to suits in case of death of officers of the
United States; Rule 37(f) relating to expenses and attorney's fees; Rule 39(c)
relating to jury trial when jury trial is required; Rule 54(d) relating to certain
costs; Rule 55(e) relating to judgment by default; Rule 62(e) relating to security
on appeal; Rule 65(c) relating to security on restraining orders.
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of the Rules to subject the United States to the provisions of Rule 33
and the other rules respecting discovery.
Rule 37 establishes a procedure to compel answers when a party
upon whom inierrogatories have been served refuses to answer. The
Rule provides among other things that the Court may award expenses
and attorney's fees against the losing party in such procedure, and it
goes on to provide, "(f) Expenses and attorney's fees are not to be
imposed upon the United States under this Rule." In its opinion the
Court argued that, "If Rule 33 is not applicable to the United States,
sub-paragraph (f) would have been omitted or it would have been
expressly stated that the United States was not subject to Rule 33."
The argument overlooks the fact -that under Rule 37 expenses and
attorney's fees may be awarded not only (1) against the interrogatee
against whom an order requiring an answer has been entered, but also
(2) against an interrogator who is unsuccessful in his attempt to obtain
an order requiring the adverse party to answer. It is at least open to
debate that sub-paragraph (f) was inserted to relieve the Government
from the burden of expenses and attorney's fees in the latter type of
case, and such a construction does not necessarily carry the connotation
that the Government stands in need of relief in the former type of case.
The evidence of contemporary history at the time of the drafting of
the Rules indicates that if the framers of the Rules had any specific
intent in this matter it was that the United States should, like any other
litigant, be required to make discovery pursuant to the provisions of the
Rules. Two prominent members of the committee which drafted the
Rules for the Supreme Court have expressly stated that this was their
interpretation.
At the Washington Institute on the Federal Rules Dean (as he then
was) Charles E. Clark, in response to a question from the floor, stated :28
"In this connection I might say that one of the series of questions
that have been given to me on behalf of the Department of Justice
raises what might be termed a general issue: How far the United States
Government is exempt from certain provisions of these rules or sub-
ject to special rules. Now from time to time in these rules where we
have felt it necessary we have provided for special rules as to the Gov-
ernment. A notable case is in the time for answer, which in Rule
12(a) is generally twenty days, but for the Government is, as you know,
sixty days. I believe the lawyers for the Government thought that that
was all too short a time for them to find out what the Government was
doing. At any rate we continue the existing law.
"Now let me say as to the general question, it was our theory that
except as we made special provisions these rules apply to the United
States as a litigant as much as to anyone else. We believe that is a
8 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION; PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASH-
I-GTONy, D. C., 49.
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sound principle and we hope it works out. Of course, as I trust you
all realize, after these rules went out of our hands we could not say
what would happen to them or how they would be read. I expect that
we may shudder sometimes to see what has happened to a particular
rule, and in this case I can't presume to say what the courts may do,
but it seems to us sound that the United States should follow these
general rules."
And in the New York Symposium on the Federal Rules, former
Attorney General William D. Mitchell spoke to similar effect.29
These statements of opinion are not "contemporary statements of
the framers" in the sense that they were made before or during the
drafting of the Rules, and there is no showing that either the other
members of the committee or the Supreme Court had this interpretation
of the Rules in mind. The two speakers, however, are such eminent
authorities in their own right that their opinions with respect to the
proper interpretation of the Rules, even though not fully considered,
should not be lightly dismissed.
It was suggested by the Court in the General Motors case that if
the Rules of Civil Procedure o not apply to the United States "there
would be no rule in such cases as to many matters of procedure." A
distinction should be taken between the applicability of the Rules in
general to cases in which the United States is a party and the appli-
cability of rules which would subject the United States to extraordinary
burdens. Thus, there can be no question but that the United States
like any other litigant is bound, as a condition of obtaining judicial
relief, to file a complaint which conforms to the standards of adequacy
of pleadings set up under the Rules. But to the extent that a rule, under
the form of a change of procedure, would in fact add to the substantive
liability of the Government, it should be held to be inapplicable to the
Government. In this way a distinction may be perceived between Rule
12, under which a defendant may call for a bill of particulars, and
Rule 33, under which a party may submit interrogatories. To the
extent that a bill of particulars is an amplification of the pleadings in
a case the Government, like any other litigant, may be required to pre-
pare such a bill. Interrogatories, on the other hand, call for matters
collateral to the pleadings, and to the extent that they perform the
function traditionally performed by a bill of discovery, the Government
should be excused from making answer.
III. COMMON-LAW PRIVILEGE
The second point involved in a discussion of this problem is that
of common-law privilege. This privilege may be of two kinds. First,
21 AMERICAN BAR AssocIATioN; PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHING-
TON, D. C., 333.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
there is the familiar privilege of the Government against disclosure of
"State secrets," and then there is the perhaps less familiar privilege
respecting the disclosure of information acquired by the Government
with respect to violations of law, particularly of criminal law.
There is no need here of extended discussion of the first type of
privilege. While the area covered by the term "State secret" is some-
what indefinite the principles underlying the privilege have been well
understood since the date of Marbury v. Madison.0
When either type of common-law privilege exists, it grows out of
the character of the information in the possession of the Government,
and is not personal to the Government or the officer within whose con-
trol the information lies. This should be abundantly clear from a line
of decisions in the various Circuit Courts of Appeals involving inter-
rogatories to members of the National Labor Relations Board, respect-
ing the methods by which decisions of the Board were arrived at.8 '
By the weight of authority32 interrogatories of this sort are improper
and need not be answered. None of the cases, however, can stand as
authority for a general immunity of the Board of its members from
interrogation. In some of the cases3 3 the rather questionable assump-
tion was made that a Court of Equity has inherent power to issue
interrogatories and does not need a statute or rule from which to draw
such jurisdiction, but this question need not be gone into here. Once
it is conceded that a given court has general jurisdiction to issue inter-
rogatories and that it has jurisdiction of an action to which a Govern-
mental officer or agency is a party, the power to issue interrogatories
may be exercised against such officer or agency.3 4 Before the inter-
rogatories need be answered, however, decision will be required as to
their propriety; that is to say, it must be decided not only whether the
interrogatories are relevant, but also as to whether they intrude upon
a Governmental privilege or derogate from the independence of a non-
judicial branch of the Government.
The Governmental privilege of principal concern here is that of
withholding information which has been disclosed to the Government
respecting violations of law. It is considered to be the civic duty of
" 1 Cranch (U. S.) 137, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803).
S" Cupples Co. v. N. L. R. B., 103 F. (2d) 953 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); N. L.
R. B. v. Cherry Cotton Mills, 98 F. (2d) 444, 98 F. (2d) 1021 (C. C. A. 5th,
1938); Inland Steel Co. v. N. L. R. B., 105 F. (2d) 246 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939);
N. L. R. B. v. Botany Worsted Mills, 106 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).
" See United States v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 421, 61 S. Ct. 999, 1004, 85
L. ed. 1429, 1435 (1941).
3 See N. L. R. B. v. Cherry Cotton Mills, 98 F. (2d) 444, 98 F. (2d) 1021
(C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
" Compare Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 L. ed.
1288 (1936) ; 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. ed. 1129 (1938) with United States
v. Morgan, 313 U. S. 409, 61 S. Ct. 999, 85 L. ed. 1429 (1941).
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every citizen to inform his Government of violations of law of which
he has knowledge, and, in order to encourage the performance of this
duty, the Government is privileged to withhold from disclosure both
the identity of the informer and the fact and details of the information
which he has given. It has been uniformly held that Government
officers cannot be required, even by court order, to disclose the name
of an informer or the content of any communications he had made to
the Government. 5 It has even been held that a defendant in a crim-
inal case is not entitled to impeach a witness against him by showing
that the witness was an informer.88 In one circuit it has been sug-
gested that there is a limitation upon this doctrine, namely, that in a
criminal case if the information in the hands of the Government is
"useful evidence to vindicate the innocence of the accused, or lessen
the risk of false testimony, or is essential to the proper disposition of
the case disclosure will be compelled.'
37
Since most of the information in the hands of any Governmental
officer or agency will have been obtained in the course of law enforce-
ment activities and is, therefore, with respect to actual or potential
violations of law, it would seem that a strict application of the doctrine
of privilege would render the Government practically immune from
almost any interrogatory that might be put to it.
IV. PRIVILEGE UNDER REVISED STATUTES §161
The third point for discussion, the extent of the Government's
statutory privilege is in a sense supplementary to the second point just
mentioned. The source of this privilege is Section 161 of the Revised
Statutes3 8 which provides:
"The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations
not inconsistent with law for the government of his department, the
conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of
its business, and the custody, use and preservation of the records,
papers and property appertaining to it."
Pursuant to the authority granted by this section the heads of the
various departments have issued orders and regulations, of which Order
No. 3229 of the Department of Justice is typical.3 9*
"The classic case is Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872) (per
Gray, J.). Followed in Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U. S. 311, 4 S. Ct. 12, 28 L. ed. 158
(1884), and in In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U. S. 532, 15 S. Ct. 959, 39 L. ed.
1080 (1895) (per Gray, J.).
" Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed. 946 (App. D. C., 1924).
"7 Wilson v. United States, 59 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1932).R. S. §161, 5 U. S. C. A. §22 (1927).
"* "Pursuant to the authority. vested'in me by R. S. §161 (U. S. Code, Title
5, §22), it is hereby ordered:
"All official files, documents; iecords and information in the offices of the
Department of Justice, including the several offices of the United States Attorneys,
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Regulations made under R. S. §161 have been before the courts on
several occasions. It has been held that the statutory phrase "not
inconsistent with law" means simply that such regulations may not
have the effect of repealing statutes. 40 Regulations are "consistent with
law" which modify the normal duty to respond to subpoena, and pre-
sumably other processes of the courts. Thus, in Ex Parte Sackett,
41
an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who had collected some
evidence with a view to its use in an antitrust proceeding, was com-
mitted for contempt of court upon his refusal to honor a subpoena
issued in the course of a private litigation calling upon him to produce
the material which he had collected. The Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered his release under a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the
statute and an order of the Attorney General issued thereunder con-
trolled the conduct of the agent and justified his refusal to honor the
subpoena.
Thanks.to the loose phrasing of an opinion 42 of Attorney General
(later Mr. Justice) Moody a distinction has been made and was fol-
lowed by the Court in the General Motors case. There the Court said,
"As to the order of the Attorney General it has been the opinion of
some of his predecessors in office that the order applied only when the
Government was asked .for the information in suits between private
parties. [Citations.] And Moore in his work on Federal Practice,
Vol. 3, pages 2641, 2642, inclines to the opinion that the prohibition
relates to cases between private parties and that, unless against public
policy in the particular case, a Court should require disclosure in an
action in which the United States is a party."
The color for this view is derived from the opinion of Attorney.
General Moody to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor,43 where it
Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Marshals, and Federal penal and
correctional institutions, or in the custody or control of any officer or employee
of the Department of Justice, are to be regarded as confidential. No officer or
employee may permit the disclosure or use of the same for any purpose other than
the performance of his official duties, except in the discretion of the Attorney
General, the Assistant to the Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General
acting for him.
"Whenever a subpoena duces tecum is served to produce any such files, docu-
ments, records or information, the officer or employee on whom such subpoena
is served, unless otherwise expressly directed by the Attorney General, will
appear in court in answer thereto and respectfully decline to produce the records
specified therein, on the ground that the disclosure of such records is prohibited
by this regulation."
'0 Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, 20 S. Ct. 701, 44 L. ed. 846 (1900).
"74 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 9th, j935). See also In re Valencia Condensed
Milk Company, 240 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 7th, 1917); Harwood v. McMurty, 22 F.
Supp. 572 (W. D. Ky. 1938).
42 Opinion to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, January 9, 1905, 25 Or.
A. G. 326."' See note 42 mpra.
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was stated that the Secretary need not produce certain documents in a
suit between private parties. That this language was not intended as
expressive of a limitation upon the doctrine of privilege is manifest
from the Attorney General's citation with approval
44 of an opinion45
of one of his predecessors (Devens), where it was ruled that the con-
fidential character of certain intra-departmental communications was a
ground for refusing their production in a suit to which the United
States was a party, viz., an action on distillers' bonds for collection of
taxes. Apart from these sources there is no authoritative ground for
restricting the application of R. S. §161 to cases in which the United
States is not a party. The statute itself is a broad and general grant
of authority to the heads of departments to make regulations concerning
the papers, records, and other property of the departments in all mat-
ters, not merely in the matter of responding to discovery processes of
the courts.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Tested in the light of these premises, the existing law is at one or
the other of two equally undesirable extremes. Either, as what seems
to the writer the more likely, the Government is ensconced behind an
impregnable wall of immunity and privilege, or, as it seemed to the
court which decided the General Motors case, it stands upon the same
level as the ordinary private litigant except as to matters involving
affairs of state. The ideal is probably somewhere between the two.
In most cases when the Government appears as a party in the
courts its stature is not reduced to that of a private party seeking relief.
Its appearance is the means of setting in motion the judicial processes
for translating the mandates of the statutes into action. It is the parens
patriae vindicating a public right, rather than an individual seeking a
private remedy. Its rights and immunities viewed in this light cannot
be measured by the same standard which 'determines the rights of
individuals.
On the other hand, unnecessary insistence upon unlimited privileges
for a "favored suitor" might be "an unjust and tyrannical exercise of
power." A Government whose rights are without measure is worse
than one whose rights are no greater than those of its citizens.
One practical suggestion, although entirely without warrant from
the existing legal materials, was advanced in a district court opinion
which was subsequently withdrawn and which has not been replaced,
at least for publication. 46 It was there suggested that the Government
" Opinion to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, January 9, 1905, 25 Op.
A. G. 328.
"Opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury, May 31, 1878, 16 Op. A. G. 24.
' Standard X-Ray Company, Inc. v. United States, 3 Fed. Rules Service 393
(N. D. Ill. 1940).
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is subject to a duty of full discovery in a litigation arising out of breach
of a proprietary contract to which it is a party.1
7°
Of course, the distinction between "sovereign" and "proprietary"
activities has been observed for many years with all too many sad re-
suits in the law of municipal corporations. Care in draftsmanship could
save legislation which adopts some such distinction from most of the
dread consequences of a "tyranny of labels."
Perhaps, too, it is time to review and re-write the common-law
privilege concerning the acts of the informers. The benefits accruing
to governments from altruistic performances of civic duty to tell of
violations of law are negligible. Most citizens will tell their Govern-
ment what they know-but only after the Government learns that they
have knowledge and puts direct questions to them. A happy medium
can undoubtedly be achieved between paralyzing law enforcement by
requiring premature disclosure of evidence and information in the hands
of the prosecuting officers, and the alternative of leaving the informa-
tion of the private litigant to the absolute discretion of an executive
officer.
Along with modifications there should also be extensions of the
rules of privilege and immunity. While the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity is applicable only to litigation carried on in the name of the
United States, and the privilege under R. S. §161 extends only to the
great departments of the Government, the enforcement of particular
laws is being increasingly entrusted to administrative officers and agen-
cies who frequently conduct civil litigation in their own names. To the
extent that such litigation has the function of enforcing important
public rights these agencies should be given substantially the same
status enjoyed by a litigating Government itself.
Probably no statute can be written which will lay down, in meticu-
lous detail, the precise extent to which discovery should be available in
every case to which the Government is a party. Any rule devised will
be subject to construction, interpretation and application by the courts.
The important thing, now that the question has been opened up, is to
consider and decide upon a solution based upon the realities of the
7* Strictly speaking there is no such a thing as a "proprietary" function of the
United States. Any acts of that Government within the limits of its constitu-
tional powers are necessarily "Governmental" or "sovereign" acts. Federal Land
Bank of St. Paul v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95, 102, 62 S. Ct. 1, 86 L.
ed. 46 (1941). But so far as the propriety of invoking immunity and privilege is
concerned there is a vast difference between, on the one hand, a suit under the
Tucker Act-to determine whether penalties for late performance should be visited
upon a contractor or upon a sub-contractor, or a suit in admiralty involving the
commission of a maritime tort by a vessel of the United States, and, on the other
hand, a proceeding in equity to dissolve an unlawful combination in restraint of
trade or a proceeding to exact compliance with an order of the National Labor
Relations Board.
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problem, rather than upon legalistic abstractions. Existing legal rules,
the only Materials upon which the courts can rely, are inadequate for
a full solution. The problem calls for the creation of new rules, and it
is devoutly to be wished that these will be forthcoming before the
question is raised in too many cases in which too many judges will
attempt to adapt the common law of the situation to their own notions
of the right and justice of the matter.
